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This paper discusses the development of the human social brain. First, I will argue that social cognition is
uniquely important and describe evidence that social interaction plays a critical role in early brain develop-
ment. I will then discuss recent research demonstrating that the social brain undergoes protracted develop-
ment and that adolescence in particular represents a period of reorganization of the social brain. Finally, I will
attempt to draw out potential implications of this new research for education policy and for human wellbeing.
Open access under CC BY license.Humans Are Exquisitely Social
Humans are an exquisitely social species.
Take the photograph shown here (Fig-
ure 1), which shows an English soccer
player, Michael Owen, having just missed
a goal for Liverpool Football Club.
The photograph beautifully illustrates
two aspects of the social brain. First, it
shows how rapid and instinctive social
responses are. Within a split second of
Michael Owen missing the goal, nearly
everyone is making identical arm gestures
and has the same expression on their
face. The other aspect of the social brain
this photograph illustrates is our ability
to read other people’s gestures and faces
in terms of their underlying emotions and
mental states. Without having to ask you
have a good idea of what they are thinking
and feeling at this precise moment in time.
We are constantly reading each others’
actions, gestures and faces in terms of
underlying mental states and emotions, inFigure 1. Owen Misses a Goal
Phil Noble/Press Association.an attempt to figure out what
other people are thinking
and feeling, and what they
are about to do next. This is
known as theory of mind or
mentalizing. Developmental
psychology research on
theory of mind has demon-
strated that the ability to
understand others’ mental
states develops over the first
four or five years of life. While
certain aspects of theory of
mind are present in infancy
(Baillargeon et al., 2010), it is
not until around the age of
four years that children begin
explicitly to understand that744 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevsomeone else can hold a belief that differs
from one’s own and which can be false
(Barresi and Moore, 1996). An under-
standing of others’ mental states plays a
critical role in social interaction because
it enables us to work out what other
people want and what they are about to
do next and to modify our own behavior
accordingly.
Social Cognition Is Special
It sounds obvious to say that interaction
with other people is critical for normal
neurocognitive development. However,
there is a striking and surprising empirical
example of the importance of social
interaction for learning from research on
language acquisition. It is well known
that many Japanese people are unable
to distinguish between R and L sounds.
However, research in the 1980s revealed
that Japanese babies are able to detect
the difference between R and L, but onlyier Inc.before about nine months (e.g., Werker,
1989). The Japanese language does not
contain distinct R and L sounds, so Japa-
nese babies are not exposed to the subtle
difference between these sounds and
eventually lose the ability to distinguish
them by the age of nine months.
A key question is whether sounds that
have been lost can be relearned. A study
confirmed that infants older than nine
months can learn to discriminate speech
sounds to which they have not previously
been exposed (Kuhl et al., 2003). Kuhl and
colleagues studied American babies
who had grown up hearing only English
and had thus lost the ability to distin-
guish between certain Chinese Mandarin
sounds (Figure 2). The authors trained
three groups of nine-month-old American
babies: one group interacted with a real
native Chinese speaker, who played with
and read to them; a second group saw
movies of the same Chinese speaker; thethird group heard the same
Chinese speaker through
headphones. The content and
the time of exposure were
identical in all three groups.
The group that had been
exposed to a real live Chinese
person significantly improved
their ability to distinguish
between the two sounds,
performing at around the
same level as native Chinese
babies. In striking contrast,
babies who had been ex-
posed to the same amount
of Chinese but in the form of
video or sound recordings
showed no learning, and their
Figure 2. Learning Language Sounds
Infants were exposed to Mandarin via live interaction with a native Mandarin speaker (A) or via audio-visual
(B) or audio-only (not shown). A control group had live exposure to language but heard only English. After
exposure, all infants were tested with two Mandarin Chinese sounds. Results indicate learning in the live
exposure group, but not in the TV or audio-only groups (C) (from Kuhl et al., 2003).
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as the American babies who had received
no exposure.
There are two implications of this
research. First, it shows that relearning is
possible. Although zero to nine months
represents a sensitive period for sound
categorization, it is possible to relearn
sounds after this window of opportunity
has closed. Second, the training results
show that social interaction is a critical
and constraining factor. There appears
to be something special about social
interaction with a real live person that is
not present from watching videos or
hearing sound recordings of the same
person. What is special about social
interaction with a real person is not yet
understood. One possibility is that social
interaction increases infants’ motivation
through enhanced attention and arousal.
Social interaction also directs the adult
trainer to focus on the learner’s individual
needs and tailors the training content for
the learner. In addition, by nine months,
infants start to understand that pointing
to, or looking in the direction of, an object
indicates that this object is being referred
to. This is one of the first building blocks of
theory of mind.The Social Brain
Over the past 15 years, a large number of
independent studies have shown remark-
able consistency in identifying the brain
regions that are involved in theory of
mind or mentalizing. These studies have
employed a wide range of stimuli including
stories, sentences, words, cartoons, and
animations, each designed to elicit the
attribution of mental states (see Amodio
and Frith, 2006, for review). In each case,
the mentalizing task resulted in the activa-
tion of a network of regions including
the posterior STS at the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), the temporal poles and
the dorsal medial PFC (mPFC; see Burnett
and Blakemore, 2009). The agreement
between neuroimaging studies in this
area is remarkable, and the consistent
localization of activity within a network of
regions including the pSTS/TPJ and
mPFC, as well as the temporal poles,
suggests that these regions are key to
the process of mentalizing.
Brain lesion studies have consistently
demonstrated that the superior temporal
lobes (e.g., Samson et al., 2004) and
PFC (e.g., Stuss et al., 2001) are involved
in mentalizing as damage to these brain
areas impairs mentalizing abilities. Inter-Neuron 6estingly, one study reported a patient
with large PFC damage whose mentaliz-
ing abilities were intact (Bird et al., 2004),
suggesting that this region is not neces-
sary for mentalizing. However, there are
other explanations for this surprising and
intriguing finding. It is possible that, due
to plasticity, this patient used a different
neural strategy in mentalizing tasks.
Alternatively, it is possible that damage
to this area at different ages has different
consequences for mentalizing abilities.
The patient described by Bird and col-
leagues had sustained her PFC lesion at
a later age (62 years) than most previously
reported patients who show impairments
of mentalizing tasks. Perhaps mPFC
lesions later in life spare mentalizing abili-
ties, whereas damage that occurs earlier
in life is detrimental. It is possible that
mPFC is necessary for the acquisition of
mentalizing but not essential for later im-
plementation of mentalizing. Intriguingly,
this is in line with recent data from devel-
opmental fMRI studies of mentalizing,
which suggest that the mPFC contributes
differentially to mentalizing at different
ages.
Development of Mentalizing during
Adolescence
A number of developmental fMRI studies
of mental state attribution have con-
sistently shown that mPFC cortex activ-
ity during mentalizing tasks decreases
between adolescence and adulthood (Fig-
ure 3). Each of these studies compared
brain activity in young adolescents and
adults while they were performing a task
that involved thinking about mental states
(see Figure 3 for details of studies).
In each of these studies, mPFC activity
was greater in the adolescent group
than in the adult group during the mental-
izing task compared to the control task.
In addition, there is evidence for dif-
ferential functional connectivity between
mPFC and other parts of the mentalizing
network across age (Burnett and Blake-
more, 2009).
To summarize, a number of develop-
mental neuroimaging studies of social
cognition have been carried out by dif-
ferent labs around the world, and there
is striking consistency with respect to
the direction of change in mPFC activity.
It is not yet understood why mPFC activity
decreases between adolescence and
adulthood during mentalizing tasks, but5, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 745
Figure 3. Medial Prefrontal Activation Decreases
during Adolescence
A section of the dorsal MPFC that is activated in studies of
mentalizing is shown between red lines: Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute (MNI) y coordinates range from 30 to 60,
and z coordinates range from 0 to 40. Colored dots indicate
voxels of decreased activity during six mentalizing tasks
between late childhood and adulthood (see Blakemore,
2008, for references). The mentalizing tasks ranged from
understanding irony, which requires separating the literal
from the intended meaning of a comment (green dots),
thinking about one’s own intentions (blue dots), thinking
about whether character traits describe oneself or another
familiar other (yellow dots; also Pfeifer et al., 2009; gray
dot), watching animations in which characters appear to
have intentions and emotions (red dot) and thinking about
social emotions such as guilt and embarrassment (Burnett
et al., 2009; pink dot). (Adapted from Blakemore, 2008).
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tions have been put forward (see
Blakemore, 2008, for details). One
possibility is that the cognitive
strategy for mentalizing changes
between adolescence and adulthood.
A second possibility is that the
functional change with age is due to
neuroanatomical changes that occur
during this period. Decreases in
activity are frequently interpreted as
being due to developmental reduc-
tions in gray matter volume, pre-
sumably related to synaptic pruning.
However, there is currently no direct
way to test the relationship between
number of synapses, synaptic activity,
and neural activity as measured by
fMRI in humans (see Blakemore,
2008, for discussion). If the neural
substrates for social cognition change
during adolescence, what are the
consequences for social cognitive
behavior?
Online Mentalizing Usage Is Still
Developing in Mid-adolescence
Most developmental studies of social
cognition focus on early childhood,possibly because children perform ade-
quately in even quite complex mentalizing
tasks at around age four. This can be
attributed to a lack of suitable paradigms:
generally, in order to create a mentalizing
task that does not elicit ceiling perfor-
mance in children aged five and older,
the linguistic and executive demands of
the task must be increased. This renders
any age-associated improvement in
performance difficult to attribute solely
to improved mentalizing ability. However,
the protracted structural and functional
development in adolescence and early
adulthood of the brain regions involved
in theory of mind might be expected to
affect mental state understanding.
Recently, we adapted a task that
requires the online use of theory of mind
information when making decisions in
a communication game and which pro-
duces large numbers of errors even in
adults (Keysar et al., 2003). In our comput-
erized version of the task, participants
view a set of shelves containing objects,
which they are instructed to move by
a ‘‘Director,’’ who can see some but not
all of the objects (Dumontheil et al.,
2010; Figure 4). Correct interpretation
of critical instructions requires partici-746 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevpants to use the director’s perspective
and only move objects that the director
can see. We tested participants aged
between 7 and 27 years and found that,
while performance in the director and
a control condition followed the same
trajectory until mid-adolescence, the mid-
adolescent group made more errors than
the adults in the director condition only.
These results suggest that the ability
to take another person’s perspective to
direct appropriate behavior is still under-
going development at this relatively late
stage.
Implications for Education
Knowledge of how the brain develops and
learns will have a profound impact on
education in the future. Understanding
the brain mechanisms that underlie learn-
ing and memory, and the effects of
genetics, the environment, emotion, and
age on learning could transform educa-
tional strategies and enable us to design
programs that optimize learning for people
of all ages and of all needs. Neuro-
science cannow offer someunderstanding
of how the brain learns new information
and processes this information throughout
life (see Blakemore and Frith, 2005).ier Inc.As described above, social interac-
tion with a real live person is critical for
at least some types of early learning
(Kuhl et al., 2003), suggesting that,
while not necessarily harmful, DVDs
and CDs aimed at teaching babies
and young children may not be asso-
ciated with optimal learning. More
importantly, the time spent watching
DVDs is time that could otherwise
be spent in social interaction with a
real person, and denying the devel-
oping brain of this might have nega-
tive consequences. We need to ask
whether online social networking,
which is particularly popular with
teenagers, is the same as real live
interaction, or whether it might be
denying the developing teenage brain
of important real life interactions.
There is as yet no research on this
important question. What is the crit-
ical factor in social interaction that is
so evidently missing from video
conferencing, and which makes it
incomparable to a meeting with real
people? There is a growing industry
for the development of robot nannies,robot carers, and robot companions for
the elderly in aging societies such as
Japan. But are robot companions the
same as real friends? Does social interac-
tion with robots determine happiness in
the same way as social relationships
with people (Argyle, 2001)? These are
open questions, ripe for research.
Understanding the brain basis of social
functioning and social development is
crucial to the fostering of social compe-
tence inside and outside the classroom.
Social functioning plays a role in shaping
learning and academic performance (and
vice versa), and understanding the neural
basis of social behavior can contribute to
understanding the origins and process of
schooling success and failure. The finding
that changes in brain structure continue
into adolescence (and beyond) has chal-
lenged accepted views and has given
rise to a recent spate of investigations
into the way cognition (including social
cognition) might change as a conse-
quence. Research suggests that adoles-
cence is a key time for the development
of regions of the brain involved in social
cognition and self-awareness. This is likely
to be due to the interplay between a
number of factors, including changes in
Figure 4. The Shelves Task
(A and B) Images used to explain the Director condition: participants were shown an example of their view
(A) and the corresponding director’s view (B) for a typical stimulus with four objects in occluded slots that
the director cannot see (e.g., the apple).
(C and D) Example of an Experimental (C) and a Control trial (D) in the Director condition. The participant
hears the verbal instruction: ‘‘Move the small ball left’’ from the director. In the Experimental trial (C), if the
participant ignored the director’s perspective, she would choose to move the distractor ball (golf ball),
which is the smallest ball in the shelves but which cannot be seen by the director, instead of the larger
ball (tennis ball) shared by both the participant’s and the instructor’s perspective (target). In the Control
trial (D), an irrelevant object (plane) replaces the distractor item.
(Adapted from Dumontheil et al., 2010).
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hormones, as well as structural and func-
tional brain development and improve-
ments in social cognition.
If early childhood is seen as a major
opportunity—or a ‘‘sensitive period’’—for
teaching, so too should the teenage
years. During both periods, particularly
dramatic brain reorganization is taking
place. The idea that teenagers should still
go to school and be educated is relatively
new. And yet the research on brain devel-
opment suggests that education during
the teenage years is vital. The brain is still
developing during this period, is adapt-able, and needs to be molded and
shaped. Perhaps the aims of education
for adolescents might change to include
abilities that are controlled by the parts
of the brain that undergo most change
during adolescence. These abilities
include internal control, multitasking,
and planning—but also self-awareness
and social cognitive skills such as the
perspective-taking and the understand-
ing of social emotions. Finally, it might
be fruitful to include in the curriculum
some teaching on the changes occurring
in the brain during adolescence. Adoles-
cents might be interested in, and couldNeuron 6benefit from, learning about the changes
that are going on in their own brains.
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